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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the fiscal sustainability of ten Eurozone member countries at a national 
and aggregate level. It is carried out in light of the relevant literature on monetary unions and 
the framework of the European Monetary Union vis-à-vis the current sovereign debt crisis. 
The impact of Eurobonds, which is considered as a viable solution, on fiscal sustainability 
was empirically tested. The results indicate that only three countries appear to be structurally 
sustainable whereas the majority of the countries are only sustainable in the short-run and two 
countries are structurally unsustainable. However, the sustainability of the Eurozone is 
greatly improved when the Eurobonds are used. 
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Introduction 
The financial crisis that started in the mid – 2007, affected most of the Eurozone countries. 
This led to an increase in budget deficits and consequently triggered a sovereign debt crisis. 
The sovereign debt crisis started in Greece in 2009, then spread and affected many Euro 
countries. The contagion from the peripheral countries of Ireland and Portugal, has affected 
some of the core Euro countries such as Italy. In addition, the exposure of European banks 
and financial institutions to sovereign debt has caused detrimental market instability that has 
compelled the governments of these countries to pass austerity measures aimed at addressing 
the budget deficits. In order to ensure a definite end to the crisis, avoid a default and a threat 
to the Euro, a decisive and effective action that will lead to the fiscal sustainability of these 
countries needs to be taken. Fiscal sustainability
4
 is a general concern to both policy makers 
and the business community as an unsustainable fiscal stance will lead to the governments’ 
inability to alleviate their debt ratios. If the situation persists, it could lead to a state of 
insolvency.  
Empirical work on the fiscal sustainability of individual Euro countries has produced 
contradictory results. For example, Papadopoulos and Sidiropoulos (1999), De Castro and 
Hernandez de Cos (2002), Trachanas & Katrakilidis (2013), Arghyron and Luintel (2007), 
Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009), and Legrenzi and Milas (2012) have found evidence that supports 
the existence of fiscal sustainability in countries that include Greece, Italy, and Spain. Afonso 
(2005) and Corsetti and Roubini (1991), on the other hand, reported results that indicate non-
sustainability of the fiscal position of the countries. In their recent work, Benassey-Quere and 
                                                 
4
 There is little consensus on what fiscal sustainability means. For example, see Afonso (2005), Arestis, et al. 
(2002) and Arghyrou and Luintel, (2007) for detail discussion on the concept. However, for clarity, fiscal 
sustainability, as used in this paper, refers to a government’s capacity in executing a set of fiscal policies whilst 
remaining solvent. Therefore, a country is considered to be fiscally sustainable when the ratio of its public debt 
to GDP is stationary and consistent with demand for government securities. 
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Roussellet (2013) have shown that the presence of systemic banking risks can significantly 
affect a country’s fiscal sustainability.  
Fiscal discipline within a monetary union is fundamental because if one country diverges, it 
will affect other members of the union. This, therefore, calls for an explicit fiscal discipline 
criteria and fiscal co-ordination mechanism. If a country is fiscally irresponsible, it will 
threaten the interests of the entire union since the other member-countries will be required to 
bear the costs of financing its debt. Consequently, a country that is in a monetary union will 
no longer be able to monetise its debt, thereby the imposition of fiscal discipline is essential 
for the survival of the union. It is to this end that fiscal consolidation of the Euro countries is 
advocated. (Arestis et al, 2002).  
This paper extends the existing literature on the fiscal sustainability of the Eurozone by 
empirically testing the sustainability of the Eurozone as a whole and testing the impact of 
Eurobonds, which has been largely overlooked by the existing literature. In addition, the 
impact of Eurobonds was analysed within the individual country context. The results indicate 
that only three core Euro countries; Germany, Finland and Austria exhibit characteristics of 
medium- and short-run fiscal sustainability. The Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland are found to be weakly sustainable.
5
 This means that without changes in fiscal and 
structural policies, these countries’ positions will deteriorate. Italy and Belgium, on the other 
hand, appear to be structurally unsustainable due to their large accumulated stock of debt. 
Drastic actions aimed at decreasing the stock of debt of these countries are required in the 
short-run whilst pursuing economic reforms for the long-run sustainability. The situation is 
more urgent in the case of Italy than Belgium. Generally, the results obtained from estimates 
that included the Eurobonds have greatly improved the fiscal sustainability of these countries, 
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 These countries, except Ireland, are among the countries that the European Commission recommended to the 
Council to extend deadlines for correcting their excessive deficit. See European Commission - MEMO/13/463   
29/05/2013 available here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-463_en.htm.  
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but the results are sensitive to the rate of interest used.
6
 The empirical evidence, therefore, 
backs the view that consolidating national debts of the Euro countries will help in addressing 
the fiscal sustainability issue among the members. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the methodology 
used in the empirical analysis and followed by the analysis of the empirical results. Based on 
the findings of the paper, some policy implications and conclusions as well as some 
limitations of the paper are discussed in the last section.   
 
Methodology  
 The paper uses the model proposed by Quintos (1995), which allows for tests for weak and 
strong fiscal sustainability. The methodology extends the framework proposed by Hakkio and 
Rush (1991) and Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The model assumes that a country’s fiscal 
sustainability holds if the inter-temporal budget balance of the country is satisfied. That is if 
the government’s current market value of its debt is equal to its future present value. The one 
period budget constraint is derived by Hakkio and Rushs (1991), which can be represented 
as:  
∆𝐵𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑅𝑡                                                                                   (1) 
where 𝐵𝑡 is the stock of marketable debt, 𝐺𝑡
𝑟 government expenditure inclusive of interest 
payments on the previous period’s stock of debt and 𝑅𝑡 is the government tax revenue. With 
forward substitutions one will obtain the inter-temporal budget constraint, which is given as:   
𝐺𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾
𝑗−1(∆𝑅𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝐸𝑡+𝑗)
∞
𝑗=0
+ lim
𝑗→∞
𝛾𝑗+1∆𝐵𝑡+𝑗            (2) 
                                                 
6
 There are two options; either to use the national interest rates or German interest rates. We have used both in 
this paper.  See Section 3 for details. 
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where 𝐸𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 + (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑟)𝐵𝑡−1 and represents government expenditure inclusive of interest 
payments on past stock of debt where the interest rates have a mean equal to zero (Quintos, 
1995). The government deficit or surplus is equal to tax revenue minus government 
expenditure inclusive of interest rate payments on the accumulated stock of government debt, 
but it is assumed that in the future the stock of debt will converge to zero. For the inter-
temporal budget balance to be fulfilled, the limit imposed on the model in equation (2) needs 
to be satisfied: 
𝐸𝑡 lim
𝑗→∞
𝛾𝑗+1 ∆𝐵𝑡+𝑗 = 0                                                                        (3) 
However, in order to test this limit it is possible to test for the stationarity of 𝐺𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑅𝑡 and 
impose a co-integrating vector of (1,-1) if both series are integrated of order one. That is, they 
are I(1) in levels. Nevertheless, one could also test for co-integration or otherwise in the 
model in equation (4). One can also test whether or not the b coefficient of government 
expenditure in the model is equal to unity:  
𝑅𝑡 = 𝜇 +  𝑏𝐺𝑡
𝑟 + 𝜖𝑡                                                                         (4) 
By using a co-integrating relationship, one can distinguish whether a country is sustainable in 
the weak or strong form, depending on the value of the coefficient b and existence of co-
integration. Hakkio and Rush (1991) argue that for a country to satisfy the strict budget 
deficit sustainability, there has to be a co-integrating relationship and the coefficient b of 
government expenditure inclusive of interest payments in equation (4) should be 0 < 𝑏 < 1.  
 
Fiscal sustainability at a National level: Unit roots, Diagnostic and Co-
integration Tests 
 
To test for fiscal sustainability at a national level, time series data for al1 the countries 
covered for the period studied are used. Government expenditure inclusive of interest rate 
payments (𝐺𝑡
𝑟) and budget surpluses are estimated as follows:  
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𝐺𝑡
𝑟 = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐵𝑡−1                                                                     (5) 
𝐺𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠                                                   (6) 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the interest rate on long term government bond yields at time t for each country. 
The following variables will be checked for unit roots for all the countries: 𝐺𝑡
𝑟, 𝐺𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑅𝑡,  𝑅𝑡, 
𝐵𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 and 𝐺𝑡. Subsequently, co-integration tests are carried out. The co-integrating 
relationship test takes the form specified in equation (4). A Wald coefficient test will be 
performed to determine the value of the coefficient b. The Wald test has a χ2 distribution and 
is similar to the F-test of joint significance with a null hypothesis, 𝐻𝑜: 𝑏 = 1 against the 
alternative, 𝐻1: 𝑏 ≠ 1. If one fails to reject the null then model suggest that the country is 
fiscally unsustainable.  
 
Fiscal Sustainability of the Eurozone at an Aggregate Level 
In order to test for the fiscal sustainability of the Eurozone at an aggregate level, an integrated 
time series are used where panel cointegration tests are carried out. Panel data is believed to 
be capable of producing more reliable estimates since the tests have greater predictability 
power, as lack of data is no longer an issue (Maddala and Kim, 1999: 137). Furthermore, as 
argued by Banjeree, (1999), when estimating the long-run relationship between two variables, 
the co-integrating relationship can be spurious when using time series data but this is not the 
case when using panel data. This is because due to the fact that the noise in the time series is 
mitigated by the cross-section dimension (Phillips and Moon, 1999). The panel co-integration 
tests of the Kao and Pedroni were used thereafter to test for the countries’ fiscal sustainability 
at the aggregate level. The tests are based on: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑧
′
𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                  (7) 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (8) 
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with a null 𝜌 = 1  in equation (8) against the alternative. The test allows for increased 
heterogeneity within the panel data, which makes it more applicable to the Euro countries 
that are generally heterogeneous (Hsiao, 2003: 216). The test has a null of 𝐻0: co-integration 
against the alternative.  
 
Impact of Eurobonds on Fiscally Sustainability of the Euro -Zone at Individual 
and at the Aggregate Levels 
In order to examine the impact of the Eurobonds on the Eurozone fiscal behaviour, a 
historical dataset from 1980 to 2010 is used. However, it is possible to estimate the impacts 
of Eurobonds by hypothetically creating “blue bonds” and “red debt” and re-examine fiscal 
sustainability of these countries at both the national and aggregate levels
7
. If a country is 
fiscally sustainable its government expenditure, inclusive of interest payments, and tax 
revenue would converge. However, Eurobonds would alter the nature and composition of 
interest payments on government bond yields. Hence, the model in equations (4) and (5) are 
modified to take into account the effects of the Eurobonds. Since the rate of interest used is 
crucial, different estimations are carried out based on equations (4) and (5) using different 
rates of interest. The modified model is given as:  
𝐺𝑡
𝑟∗ = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 +  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1                                            (9) 
where 𝑟𝑏𝑡 is the rate of interest  on “blue bonds” and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the interest rates on “red debt”, 
which are different for each country. Considering that in the original model of equation (4), 
𝐺𝑡
𝑟 included interest payments on the stock of debt in the previous period, it is assumed that 
the stock of debt considered for “blue bonds” will not change, if a country has a debt ratio 
                                                 
7
“Blue bond” refers to Eurobonds that are jointly issued by Euro countries up to 60% of their GDP, which will 
be repaid under all circumstances. They will be fully guaranteed and to enjoy super-safe AAA rating. Eurobonds 
issued above 60% of GDP would have to be issued in the national bond markets and labelled “red bonds”. This 
is a junior tranche that will face a higher risk premium. For full discussions on the proposed Eurobonds, see 
Delpla, Jaques; von Weizsäcker, Jakob (2011) and De Grauwe, (2012).  
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higher than 60% of its GDP. However, the excess debt, classified as “red debt” would change 
from year to year. For instance, Italy’s debt exceeded 60% of its GDP in 1983, thereafter only 
“red debt” changed.  
Eurobonds I 
The test of fiscal sustainability of the countries using the German interest rates is given as:  
𝐺𝑡
𝑟∗ = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 +  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1                                      (10) 
where 𝑟𝑏𝑡 denotes German historical interest rates  and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 represents the domestic interest 
rate of the country, for example for Italy, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 is Italian interest rates. Using historical interest 
rate data it is equivalent to estimating the impact of Eurobonds on fiscal sustainability had 
they been introduced in 1980.  
Eurobonds II 
The German re-unification caused a spike in the stock of debt and consequently on interest 
rates. Therefore, the German interest rate in 2010 is considered to be unaffected from any 
effects of the reunification and is used for the whole sample periods, which modified the 
model in equation (9) to:  
𝐺𝑡
𝑟∗ = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 2010 𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 +  𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1                         (11) 
Eurobonds III 
Lastly, the Italian interest rate in 2010 is also used for the 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑡 to check if it significantly alters 
the results obtained in equation (10). Consequently, the following is estimated:  
𝐺𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑡
𝑟∗ = 𝐺𝑡 + 𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 2010𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 +  𝑟𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 2010𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1  (12) 
This estimation enables us to simulate the impact of Eurobonds on fiscal sustainability had 
they been introduced in 2010.  
 
Eurobonds and the fiscal sustainability of the Eurozone  
9 
 
Will the Eurobonds change the fiscal sustainability of the Eurozone as a whole? In order to 
test this hypothesis, the original model outlined above is used, but the composition of 
government expenditure inclusive of interest rate payments is changed. The same methods 
for panel unit roots and co-integration will be used for the three separate estimations of fiscal 
sustainability using the Eurobonds.  
 
It is expected that national fiscal sustainability will be sensitive to the interest rates used and 
this will also be relevant for the fiscal sustainability of the whole Eurozone. It is possible that 
Eurobonds I will not significantly alter the fiscal sustainability of the countries, as historical 
interest rates have been relatively high and volatile. The spread between German interest 
rates bond yields and on other countries varies substantially among the countries.
8
 
However, it is possible that Eurobonds II and Eurobonds III could ameliorate the countries’ 
fiscal sustainability, as the interest rates will be significantly lower than the historical series 
used in Eurobonds I. This would bolster the arguments of those favouring the introduction of 
Eurobonds.  
 
Discussion of the Data and the Empirical Results 
The data-set used covers the period between 1980 and 2010, which is obtained from the 
OECD National Accounts Database, the Eurostat Database and the IMF IFS Database. The 
variables are total marketable government debts, total general government expenditure and 
revenue and interest rates on long term (10 year) government bonds.  
                                                 
8
 We have calculated the ratio of spread in interest rates to change in growth. If interest rate on government debt 
increases faster than economic growth, then a country is become unsustainable. This is similar to the Present 
Value of Borrowing Constraint, PVBC constraint (Alfonso, 2005). The ratio calculates the average spread of 
interest rates (on long term government yields) of EMU member countries with that of Germany’s. The spread 
on interest rates on bond yields had substantially decreased at the start of the Euro. The results indicate that the 
average spread of interest rates with reference to German rate, in 1980-1991 was 57.12% in 1992-1999 it fell to 
29.55% in 2000 and reached 2.60% in 2006. However, it increased again in the last period to 22.28%. It was 
only Luxembourg that had interest rates lower than Germany between 2000 and 2006.  
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National Fiscal Sustainability  
Table 1 reports the results on the fiscal sustainability in Europe, which illustrates the 
imbalances within the monetary union. Only three of the eleven countries examined are 
strongly sustainable. These are Germany, Austria and Finland. Germany has always been 
known for being fiscally prudent, and considering how closely dependent Austria’s economy 
is on Germany, the results indicate that it also follows the German fiscal stance. Finland 
experienced a severe crisis in the 1990s and since then it has kept its public finances in order. 
On the other hand, most countries appear to be weakly sustainable: France, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Considering, the impact of the financial crisis and the “catch-up” 
phase of Ireland, Spain and Portugal it not surprising that they are found to be weakly 
sustainable. It is somewhat surprising that France and Netherlands are considered weakly 
sustainable. This could have some serious implications for the EMU as a whole, if France and 
Germany are to be the main guarantors of the European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF 
and the Eurobonds (Barber, 2011). Lastly, results for Italy and Belgium indicate that the 
countries are fiscally unsustainable. This is consistent with the countries’ accumulated stock 
of debt that stands at 109% and 96% of their GDP, respectively, in 2010. The S&P credit 
rating for both countries for most of 2010 was “stable”. Fiscal sustainability of the countries 
was not, generally, reflected in their credit ratings. Credit ratings usually take into account 
more than just government revenues, government expenditure and interest payments when 
calculating each country’s rating. The belief of an implicit guarantee of a bail-out could also 
have influenced their ratings. Therefore, one would expect the credit ratings of these 
countries to be worse than what was reported.  
 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) identify government debt in the range of 80% -100% of a country’s 
GDP as being excessively high and would have negative consequences for the economy. 
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High debt “raises real volatility, increases financial fragility and reduces average growth” 
(Cecchetti, et al., 2011). This was implied in the Maastricht Treaty criteria, as policymakers 
believed that the optimal public debt ratio was 60% of a country’s GDP. This ratio was also 
believed to be a realistic threshold (Bismut and Jacquet, 1997). According to this view, Italy, 
Belgium, Portugal and Greece have such high levels of debt. In certain respects, credit rating 
agencies seemed to have recognised this as three of these countries’ credit ratings  were re-
classified as having “negative” outlooks as at 2011 (Standard and Poor, 2011).  
 
Eurozone Fiscal Sustainability 
An integrated time series is used to evaluate fiscal sustainability at an aggregate level; this 
could have important repercussions for the Eurozone’s ability to counteract any crisis. 
According to both Kao and Pedroni panel co-integration tests, there is a long run relationship 
between tax revenues and government expenditure inclusive of interest rate payments for the 
Eurozone as a whole. Thus it appears that in general, governments of these countries spend 
beyond their means. However, seeing how the majority of the countries were only weakly 
sustainable, as reported in Table 1 was not unexpected.  
 
National Fiscal Sustainability Using Eurobonds  
In order to examine how national fiscal sustainability changes when countries debt is 
converted to “blue bonds” and “red debt”, three different tests were performed. First, using 
the German historic rate of interest; secondly, using the German rate of interest at 2010, and; 
thirdly, using the countries’ national rate of interest. The results are reported in Table 3. 
When the German  historical interest rate on 10 year bond yields for the “blue bonds” and 
national historical interest rates for the “red debt” are used, only Finland remains strongly 
fiscally sustainable while Belgium experiences an improvement in its fiscal sustainability, 
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becoming weakly sustainable. The fiscal sustainability of Austria and Spain became worse 
than what was reported in Table 2. The fiscal sustainability of the remaining countries does 
not seem to be significantly different from the previous ones.  
 
The results also indicate that using the German interest rate on 10 year bond yields in 2010 
for the interest rate on all “blue bonds”, has significantly improved the sustainability of 
France, Italy and Belgium. However, Finland’s fiscal sustainability worsens. This could be 
interpreted as the cost of guaranteeing the debt of more indebted countries like Italy and 
Belgium. The situation remains the same for national fiscal sustainability for the remaining 
six countries. The effects are significant, but not substantial. When the German 2010 interest 
rate is used for “blue bonds”, and national 2010 interest rate for “red debt”, this leads to a 
significant change in the fiscal sustainability of all the countries considered. The fiscal 
sustainability of five countries: France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Ireland along with 
the rest, apart from Belgium become strongly sustainable. Similar to the previous results, 
only Finland recorded a decline in its sustainability; becoming weakly sustainable. Hence, 
Eurobonds III (using 2010 interest rates for “blue bonds” and “red debt”) could be a viable 
solution as they positively and significantly improve the fiscal sustainability of most of the 
countries.  
 
Fiscal Sustainability for the Whole Euro-Zone Using Eurobonds 
It is evident from the foregoing that the Eurobonds have improved the fiscal sustainability of 
the countries as they alter the composition of 𝐺𝑡
𝑟∗, but the debt is sensitive to the type of  
interest rates that are used. If one were to use Eurobonds I, the Eurozone would still be 
considered fiscally unsustainable, as found by both Pedroni and Kao co-integration tests 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. However, when using Eurobonds II, the Kao test suggests that 
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there is co-integration between government expenditure and tax revenues. Nevertheless, the 
Pedroni tests, fail to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration.  
Lastly, both Kao and Pedroni tests (Table 5) show that there is co-integration between tax 
revenues and government expenditure inclusive of interest rate payments when using German 
and national interest rates in 2010 for “blue” bonds and “red debt”. Therefore, it appears that 
the Eurobonds could indeed significantly improve fiscal sustainability of the countries, both 
at national and at the Eurozone levels.  
 
Table 6 presents the summary of the estimated results. It summarizes the results and classifies 
the countries’ fiscal positions into strongly sustainable, weakly sustainable and un-
sustainable. Three countries are found to be strongly sustainable based on national analysis. 
These are Germany, Austria and Finland. Five countries; France, Netherlands, Spain, Ireland 
and Portugal are weakly sustainable. Italy and Belgium are the only countries that are 
nationally un-sustainable.
9
 The results almost remained the same when the Eurobonds and the 
German historic interest rates were used, with the exception that the fiscal position of Austria 
deteriorated to weakly sustainable. However, when the Eurobonds and the 2010 German’s 
interest rates were used, the fiscal stance of all the countries improved and they have all 
become sustainable. Even Italy that was found to be un-sustainable in the previous results 
became strongly sustainable along with France and Netherlands. Overall, the analysis 
strongly supports the argument for the consolidation of the Euro countries’ national debts.  
 
Conclusion, Policy Implementations and Limitation 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of fiscal sustainability of ten Euro 
member countries and the whole union as well as evaluating whether or not the suggested 
                                                 
9
 The results at the national level are consistent with the ones reported on Italy and Spain by Trachanas and 
Katrakilidis (2013) who studied fiscal sustainability of Greece, Italy and Spain.  
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fiscal consolidation of the Euro countries’ national debts is a viable, long term solution to the 
current sovereign debt crisis. It empirically investigated the effects of the Eurobonds on the 
Euro countries’ national debts. The role of the Eurobonds in fiscal sustainability of the 
countries studied at both national and Euro zone levels is investigated. This is with the aim of 
finding out if the Eurobonds would give governments of the member countries of the Euro 
room for manoeuvring to deal with their domestic structural issues and achieve a minimum 
fiscal sustainability. The results, based on the national data, indicate that only three core 
countries (Germany, Finland and Austria) showed characteristics of medium term fiscal 
sustainability. Five countries (Netherlands, France, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) appear to be 
weakly sustainable, meaning that without a change in their fiscal policy and taking structural 
actions their positions may deteriorate. Two countries (Italy and Belgium), on the other hand, 
appear to be structurally unsustainable due to their large accumulated stock of debt. To 
achieve sustainability, the countries need to take drastic steps to reduce their stock of debt 
whilst pursuing economic reform for a long-run sustainability. This is more pertinent in the 
case of Italy as indicated by its debt ratio relative to that of Germany. Constant increase in the 
stock of debt accompanied by increase in inflation relative to Germany will aggravate the 
reduction in economic activity
10
. Belgium’s economy is closely linked to Germany’s 
economy, but its historic stock of debt is problematic. The results obtained from the estimates 
that included the Eurobonds found that the fiscal sustainability of the countries, both at 
individual and Euro levels has substantially improved, but is dependent on the rate of interest 
rates used.  
 
The framework used in the paper can be applied to studying the fiscal sustainability of non-
Euro countries, either at individual or at aggregate levels where the countries participate in a 
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 This is discussed in Section 2. 
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monetary union like those in Euro or otherwise. For example, it can be used to analyse fiscal 
sustainability of the individual states in the US or to study fiscal sustainability of the US as a 
whole. Other potential candidates are the CFA zones of West and Central Africa. The 
analysis, as found in this paper, can shed light on the policy implication of having a monetary 
union without a fiscal consolidation.  
 
The main limitation of the study is that the framework used only takes into account the 
relationship between government expenditure, interest rate payments on stock of debt and tax 
revenue. However, the ageing population in Europe can negatively affect public finances as it 
poses the threat of an increased burden on pensions and the diminishing growth rate of the 
labour force. This is the main limitation of the study. This, points to a future research where a 
model that will address this could be used. 
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Table 1 
 Fiscal sustainability nationally 
Country 𝝁𝒕 𝑮𝒕
𝒓 𝑹𝟐 Sustainability 
Germany 5.5213* 0.5443* 0.0698 Strongly sustainable 
France -0.8606 0.9503* 0.8438 Weakly  sustainable 
Italy -3.069124 1.0247* 0.9503 Unsustainable 
Austria 1.0952* 0.7882* 0.9503 Strongly Sustainable 
Netherlands 1.8436 0.7431* 0.7231 Weakly sustainable 
Belgium 2.4882     0.6529*    0.3746 Unsustainable 
Finland 8.7047* 0.1926 0.0676 Strongly Sustainable 
Spain 14.8845** -0.1625 0.0064 Weakly sustainable 
Ireland 15.7370* -0.4281 0.0699 Weakly sustainable 
Portugal 4.0847 0.5304* 0.2863 Weakly sustainable 
Source: OECD data and IMF IFS data 
*Significant at 5%, ** Significant at 10% (Some variables may not be significant due to lack of data). 
 
Table 2 
Pedroni Panel Cointegration 
 
 
 
 
Panel V 
 
Panel 
Rho 
Panel PP Panel ADF Group Rho Group PP Group ADF 
t-statistic -1.8180 2.5528 2.8458 2.2053 2.6088 2.4766 1.7617 
P-value 0.9655 0.9947 0.9978 0.9863 0.9955 0.9934 0.9609 
Kao Panel Co-integration 
t-statistic                      0.192032 
P-value 0.4239 
  
 
 
 
Table 3 
 Eurobonds and sustainability when using German historical interest rates 
Country  𝜇𝑡 𝐺𝑡
𝑟  𝑅2 Sustainability 
France -3.2225 1.1043* 0.7671 Weakly sustainable 
Italy -0.1299 0.8413* 0.7158 Unsustainable 
Austria 0.9228 0.8007* 0.9167 Weakly sustainable 
Netherlands 1.5107 0.7652* 0.6801 Weakly Sustainable 
Belgium     3.5712     0.5766*     0.4060 Weakly sustainable 
Finland 9.3281* 0.1431 0.0195 Strongly sustainable 
Spain -1.0179 0.9473 0.0984 Unsustainable 
Ireland 14.6428* -0.3416 0.0259 Weakly sustainable 
Portugal -1.8561 1.0000* 0.6594 Weakly sustainable 
Eurobonds with German and national interest rates at 2010 values 
Country  𝜇𝑡 𝐺𝑡
𝑟  𝑅2 Sustainability 
France 4.3772* 0.6188* 0.9800 Strongly sustainable  
Italy 2.1188* 0.7213* 0.9819 Strongly sustainable  
Austria 3.6414* 0.6154* 0.9956 Strongly sustainable 
Netherlands 3.3875* 0.6587* 0.9406 Strongly sustainable 
Belgium 3.5830* 0.5957* 0.8675 Weakly sustainable 
Finland 3.7556* 0.6035* 0.5467 Weakly sustainable  
Spain -2.0996 1.0499* 0.6984 Weakly sustainable   
Ireland -1.0373 0.9684* 0.4669 Strongly sustainable  
Portugal 3.5004* 0.5946* 0.8686 Weakly sustainable 
Source: OECD data and IMF IFS data  
*Significant at 5%,  (Some variables may not be significant due to lack of data) 
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Table 4 
 Eurobonds Kao Panel Co-integration 
 Eurobonds I Eurobonds II Eurobonds III 
t-statistic 0.691331 -2.2509 -2.769669 
P-value 0.2447 0.0122* 0.0028* 
 
Table 5 
 Eurobond I Pedroni Panel Cointegration 
 
 
 
 
Panel V 
 
Panel 
Rho 
Panel PP Panel ADF 
Group 
Rho 
Group PP 
Group 
ADF 
t-statistic -1.6806 2.0967 2.3042 2.0967 2.7437 2.9219 3.0775 
P-value 0.9536 0.9820 0.9894 0.9820 0.9970 0.9983 0.9990 
Eurobond II Pedroni Panel Cointegration 
t-statistic 0.4322 0.4457 0.3808 -1.0349 1.6188 1.7761 0.6254 
P-value 0.3328 0.6721 0.6483 0.1504 0.9473 0.9621 0.2659 
Eurobond III Pedroni Panel Cointegration 
t-statistic 4.0955 -1.2003 -0.0824 -2.3924
* 1.5542 1.8124 -1.7527* 
P-value 0.0000
* 0.1150 0.4672 0.0084 0.9399 0.9650 0.0398 
 
Table 6 
Fiscal Sustainability: Summary 
Nationally 
Strongly Sustainable Weakly Sustainable Unsustainable 
Germany France Italy 
Austria Netherlands Belgium 
Finland Spain  
 Ireland  
 Portugal  
Eurobonds with German Historic Interest Rates 
Strongly Sustainable Weakly Sustainable Unsustainable 
Finland France Italy 
 Austria Spain 
 Netherlands  
 Belgium  
 Ireland  
 Portugal  
Eurobonds with German and National Interest Rates at 2010 
Strongly Sustainable Weakly Sustainable Unsustainable 
France Belgium  
Italy Finland  
Austria Spain  
Netherlands Ireland  
 Portugal  
